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Abstract. Does the sectoral composition of aggregate economic growth affect 
poverty? We ask whether agricultural growth in developing countries increases the 
expenditures of poorer households more than growth in other sectors.  
While some reduced form analyzes have tackled this question using either country-
level times series data, regional panel data for one country, or cross-sectional 
country data, this paper is unusual in using panel data for many countries.  
We improve on much of the existing literature by not only providing evidence that 
sectoral GDP growth is endogenous, but also devising an instrumental variables 
strategy to correct for this endogeneity, involving averaging over sectoral income 
growth rates for neighboring countries.  
Our principal finding from our instrumental variable estimator is that the estimated 
elasticities associated with growth in agricultural income are significantly greater 
than for non-agricultural income for all but the extreme top and bottom deciles. In 
the middle range of the income distribution the effect of a given GDP growth due 
to agriculture is 3 to 4 times larger than if it was due to non-agricultural activities.  
Having established that on average growth in GDP originating in agriculture is more 
beneficial for poorer deciles, we finally explore whether this is a pattern which holds 
across different groupings of countries. A second important finding is that there is 
heterogeneity across some groupings. Most particularly, we find that it is the poorest 
people in the poorest countries for whom agricultural income growth is the most 
beneficial.  
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ESTIMATING THE RELATIVE BENEFITS OF AGRICULTURAL
GROWTH ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURES
Abstract. Does the sectoral composition of aggregate economic growth affect poverty?
We ask whether agricultural growth in developing countries increases the expenditures of
poorer households more than growth in other sectors.
While some reduced form analyzes have tackled this question using either country-level
times series data, regional panel data for one country, or cross-sectional country data, this
paper is unusual in using panel data for many countries.
We improve on much of the existing literature by not only providing evidence that sectoral
GDP growth is endogenous, but also devising an instrumental variables strategy to correct
for this endogeneity, involving averaging over sectoral income growth rates for neighboring
countries.
Our principal finding from our instrumental variable estimator is that the estimated
elasticities associated with growth in agricultural income are significantly greater than for
non-agricultural income for all but the extreme top and bottom deciles. In the middle range
of the income distribution the effect of a given GDP growth due to agriculture is 3 to 4
times larger than if it was due to non-agricultural activities.
Having established that on average growth in GDP originating in agriculture is more
beneficial for poorer deciles, we finally explore whether this is a pattern which holds across
different groupings of countries. A second important finding is that there is heterogeneity
across some groupings. Most particularly, we find that it is the poorest people in the poorest
countries for whom agricultural income growth is the most beneficial.
1. Introduction
While aggregate growth in an economy may improve the welfare of both wealthy and poor
households, the latter are most usually rural, and rural households have employment and
incomes that depend disproportionately on agriculture. It is natural to wonder if growth in
aggregate agricultural income has a different effect on the welfare of poorer households than
does growth elsewhere in the economy. The question is an important one for many policy
issues. Faced with continuing extensive poverty, many development agencies and scholars
have suggested the need to refocus growth on agriculture (World Bank, 2007; Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation, 2011), arguing that the alternatives of redistributing income generated
outside of agriculture or migration out of agriculture to urban areas are difficult to achieve
and create other problems.
Date: August 19, 2016.
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Of course, we are not the first to wonder whether growth in agriculture may be more
effective than growth in the rest of the economy in reducing poverty; an extensive theoretical
and empirical literature already exists on the subject which we discuss in Section 2. The
theoretical literature focuses on the different transmission mechanisms of an exogenous gain
in agricultural productivity on poverty, while the empirical literature analyzes the reduced
form relationship, and generally documents a stronger association between poverty reduction
and growth originating in agriculture compared to growth originating in non-agriculture, with
the exception of Latin American countries.
In this paper we tackle this question by comparing changes in the level and distribu-
tion of household expenditures due to growth in both aggregate agricultural and aggregate
non-agricultural income. We use growth in household expenditures as the outcome of inter-
est because we believe expenditures to be the best available indicator of material well-being;
also, these are the data generally used for poverty calculations for most low-income countries.
However, our analysis differs from most other studies in several aspects. First, we consider
growth in expenditures across the entire distribution rather than the simple poverty head-
count ratio, giving a richer picture of the effect of sectoral growth on welfare. Second, we use
the deciles as defined within each country, rather than a common international benchmark
of expenditures. To correct the underlying assumption that deciles of very different coun-
tries have similar relationship with agriculture, we then pursue some heterogeneity analysis.
Finally, we tackle the issue of simultaneity between sectoral income and expenditures using
an instrumental variable approach, allowing us to take a stand on the causality of sectoral
growth on welfare.
The simple regression we would like to estimate relates expenditure growth for differently
positioned households to growth in sectoral income, the latter weighted by its share in total
aggregate income; this is described in Section 4. The question of whether the poor benefit
more from agricultural income growth than growth in other sectors could then be answered
simply by examining the relative size of the coefficients on aggregate income growth from
agriculture and from other sectors.
In practice, there is a series of challenges we must face before estimating such a regression.
First, we do not have household level data that would allow us to make comparisons across
countries. Instead, we use data from the World Bank’s PovcalNet project and consider
estimates of household expenditures from different expenditure deciles; in effect we construct
a panel of ten representative ‘households’ for each country, each representing an expenditure
decile.1 We discuss these data in Section 3.1.
1If households are very mobile then some fraction of these may move across deciles; this poses a challenge
our data does not equip us to face.
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Second, the resulting ‘panel’ is extremely unbalanced, since the underlying expenditure
surveys are conducted at irregular intervals. This creates some important accounting issues
when we turn to estimation, treated in Section 4.1.
Third, some countries, some years, and perhaps some deciles can naturally be expected to
have different expenditure growth rates for reasons unrelated to sectoral income growth. A
global financial shock may cause expenditure growth to slow for everyone; households’ risk
attitudes or time preferences may imply different rates of expenditure growth across deciles
(Lawrance, 1991); the endowments of a particular country or some aspect of the structure
of its economy may imply systematically different rates of expenditure or income growth
even over long periods; and variation in the global price of agricultural commodities will
change the composition of income across sectors for many countries. We attempt to deal
with these kinds of alternative sources of variation in expenditure and income growth in
a fairly agnostic manner, by using fixed effects and related methods for dealing with what
Wooldridge (2002) calls “unobserved effects.” So: we account for aggregate cross-country
shocks using a collection of time effects; and for systematically different rates of expenditure
growth across the distribution we use a set of decile fixed effects. We would be inclined to
also use a complete set of country fixed effects to deal with differences in endowments, but
with these we reach the limits of our dataset; instead we employ a set of continent fixed
effects, which in practice seems to be effective.
Fourth, the stochastic process governing country-level agricultural income exhibits more
time-series variance than does income from other sectors. From the point of view of our
exercise, this greater variance produces a ‘bias’ in the resulting estimates of the connection
between agricultural income and welfare, since we are interested not in the short-run effect
of things like weather shocks on expenditures but on the longer-run effects of things like
improvements in agricultural productivity. We are also concerned about the related issue
of endogeneity; even the simplest general equilibrium models with investment imply simul-
taneity in the determination of income and expenditures. We address these issues using
a simple instrumental variables strategy, using averages of neighboring countries’ sectoral
income growth as instruments for own-income growth (see Section 4.2).
Fifth, even after controlling for time, continent, and decile fixed effects in growth, we are
concerned that there may be heterogeneity across countries in the way agricultural income
growth affects households in different parts of the expenditure distribution. We explore this
possible heterogeneity by interacting various fixed or pre-determined country characteristics
with income growth from different sectors, reporting those results in Section 5.4.
We summarize our main results. First, poorer households’ expenditures grow more in
response to growth from agriculture than do the expenditures of wealthier households, and
this holds across all deciles. We call this result monotonicity, and it is both very robust
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and important. Monotonicity also holds for growth from non-agricultural sources, but in the
opposite direction, with wealthier households’ expenditures responding more than poorer
households’. Second, it is not just across deciles that we see an effect: within poorer deciles,
households benefit significantly more from growth in agriculture than they do from growth
in other sectors. Third and finally, the connection between expenditure and sectoral income
growth is importantly and significantly different across different groups of countries. In
particular, it is the poorest households in the poorer countries for whom agricultural income
growth is most important.
2. Theory and Empirical Evidence
From a theoretical standpoint, a long tradition of dual economy models that aggregate the
economy into two sectors—agriculture and non-agriculture—has served to identify the trans-
mission mechanisms of an exogenous agricultural productivity increase on welfare (Johnston
and Mellor, 1961). Transmission mechanisms include employment, food prices, real wages,
and the demand for non-tradable goods produced in the rural non-farm economy.
The tradition in the dual economy literature is to assume that consumption expenditures
are equal to real income and that labor income is the source of expenditures while capital
income is saved and invested. An increase in growth in one sector would affect the welfare
of only the part of the population actually employed in that sector. If expenditures are dis-
tributed differently across households in the two sectors, then an increase in employment in
one sector will have an effect on the aggregate distribution of expenditures. If, for example,
households employed in the agricultural sector tend to be poorer, an increase in agricul-
tural employment will have an equalizing effect on the entire distribution of expenditures
(Thorbecke and Jung, 1996).
For a country with a closed economy (or simply high costs to trade), an increase in
agricultural productivity induces a decrease in food prices. All consumers benefit from lower
food prices, but most particularly the poor, who typically spend a larger share of their
income on food (Mellor, 1978). If there is surplus labor and wages are tied to the cost of
living to secure a fixed real subsistence wage, lower food prices can induce a decrease in the
nominal wage, fostering employment and growth in the non-agricultural sector (Lele and
Mellor, 1981).
When workers are mobile and wages are equated across sectors, differences in the rate of
growth of different sectors can result in changes in the distribution of expenditures through
the employment effect. For example, Loayza and Raddatz (2010) formulate a model in which
expenditures of the poor are equal to the prevailing wage, while non-poor households can
borrow or lend to smooth away the effects of variation in labor income on expenditures
(alternatively, one could assume that the non-poor are the owners of the economy’s capital
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stock). The model shows that the effects of sectoral growth on real wages are larger for sectors
with larger employment and a lower elasticity of demand for labor, namely agriculture and
services.
Another strand of literature is based on a three-sector aggregation of the economy, with
a non-tradable sector in addition to the agricultural and, say, manufacturing sectors. A key
determinant of the overall effect of an initial growth impetus in agriculture is the linkages
created in fostering demand for the non-tradable sector products (Haggblade et al., 1991).
To the extent that labor is not fully mobile, then in addition to asymmetric effects on the
functional sources of income any growth that originates in the rural economy stands to have
a more direct impact on the rural population, where many of the poor live.
Much of the empirical support to the claim that agricultural growth is good for aggregate
growth, employment, and welfare is based on simulation models that rely on demand and
supply elasticities that are not estimated (see for example Haggblade et al., 1991). Thorbecke
and Jung (1996) use social accounting with postulated elasticities applied to Indonesia, thus
finding that agriculture and services contribute more to poverty reduction that the industrial
sectors.
Within-country or within-region studies arguably offer the best evidence we have on the
connection between aggregate agricultural income growth and household welfare, perhaps
because in these contexts one can construct a proper panel dataset. In an important se-
ries of papers Datt and Ravallion (Ravallion and Datt, 1996; Datt and Ravallion, 1998b,a)
use panel data for states in India and show a systematic and relatively uniform association
between agricultural growth and poverty reduction, but a very heterogeneous relationship
between non-agricultural growth and poverty change. With province-level panel data for
China over the period 1985–1996, Fan et al. (2005) find that agricultural growth is asso-
ciated with a reduction of rural poverty while non-agricultural growth is associated with
an increase in rural poverty. With provincial data for 1983–2001, Montalvo and Ravallion
(2010) show that the primary sector was the driving force behind the spectacular decrease in
poverty in China. Suryahadi et al. (2009) conduct an exercise similar to that of Ravallion and
Datt (1996) but for Indonesia, and are able to distinguish between the rural and urban poor.
They find that growth in services is good for both the rural and urban poor, with the effects
of agricultural growth focused more specifically on the rural poor. In a similar spirit, Warr
(2006) uses national data from four Asian countries (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the
Philippines) from the 1960s to 1999 in a panel analysis and finds similar results, in that
growth in agriculture and services were associated with a decrease in poverty, with the esti-
mated coefficient on agriculture substantially smaller than the coefficient on services, and the
coefficient on manufacturing not significantly different from 0. Looking at the 25 countries
with the greatest success at reducing extreme poverty under the period of the Millennium
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Development Goals, Cervantes-Godoy and Dewbre (2010) find that while economic growth
was a key determinant, growth in agricultural incomes was especially important. Bresciani
and Valdes (2007) provide evidence of the role of agricultural growth on poverty reduction
through rural labor markets, farm incomes, food prices, and economy-wide multipliers in
different country case studies.
Other studies have resorted more systematically to cross-sectional country-level time series
data, thus looking for average effects across a large set of countries and hence economic struc-
tures. Using data from 80 countries spanning 1980 to 2002, Christiaensen et al. (2011) find a
stronger association between overall poverty decrease and growth originating in agriculture
(an elasticity they call “participation”) than growth originating in either of the other two sec-
tors. With higher participation, slower growth of agriculture may still deliver more poverty
reduction than the growth of non-agriculture. In contrast, using a slightly different method,
Bravo-Ortega and Lederman (2005) find that in Latin America, it is the non-agricultural
sector that has the strongest effect in reducing poverty. Focusing on the role of the unskilled
labor market, Loayza and Raddatz (2010) find evidence that growth in income from sectors
with high unskilled labor shares has a disproportionate effect in reducing poverty rates. In a
somewhat different specification, Dollar et al. (2016) regress growth rates in incomes of the
poorest 20 percent on growth in average income and on changes in the share of agriculture
in GDP. The significance of the coefficient on the agricultural variable suggests that, even
controlling for aggregate growth, faster growth in agriculture is likely to disproportionately
benefit the poor.
There is also a literature that challenges the dominant role of agricultural growth for
poverty reduction. Lanjouw et al. (2013) for example argue that it is the non-agricultural
sector in the rural areas that is both more dynamic and more pro-poor, and hence the most
important contributor to poverty reduction in rural India. Collier and Dercon (2014) note
that productivity in agriculture, and especially in the smallholder sector, is so low that
economic development and poverty alleviation in Africa will have to come from a radical
transformation of the agricultural sector and massive exodus from agriculture. They also cite
works on the role of migration in the reduction of poverty in rural areas. Most of the literature
that cautions against the importance given to agriculture for poverty alleviation however
relates to a different argument: while the relatively strong poverty impact of agricultural
growth seems to be a fairly robust result, the cost of investing to obtain a given growth is
far higher in agriculture than in other sectors, making it an inefficient instrument for growth
and welfare (Dercon and Gollin, 2014). Our paper does not address this issue at all, but
aims at contributing to the literature on the sectoral growth-poverty linkage.
An issue in almost all of the studies we have discussed is simultaneity between sectoral
growth and the welfare indicator used in the analysis. A contribution of this paper is to
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tackle this issue by using an instrumental variable approach to try to measure the effect of
an exogenous increase in sectoral growth on welfare. We use the same database collected by
the World Bank as do other cross country analyses, although we only select the countries for
which welfare is measured by consumption expenditures.2 We also use data on all deciles,
rather than only on e.g., poverty rates, as in Christiaensen et al. (2011) and other studies
described above.
When using cross-country evidence on changes in the distribution of income or expendi-
tures one has to make an early choice regarding whether it is better to consider the distribu-
tion of these welfare measures within countries or across countries. The former choice leads
to an empirical strategy that groups together different welfare quantiles across countries, so
that for example, one imagines that the poorest 10 percent of households in Tanzania are
similarly positioned to the poorest 10 percent of households in China, despite the substantial
differences in the level of real expenditures of the quantile across these two countries. The
latter choice construes distribution as a global phenomenon, with the result that the poorest
10 percent of all households globally may all be located in a very small number of countries.
If what we want to measure is the global distribution of welfare one also logically ought to
weight countries by their populations in any cross-country analysis.
Different researchers have made different choices.3 In this paper we take the country-
focused approach, and analyze the relationship between welfare and sectoral growth of all
deciles of the distribution within countries, rather than on a measure of poverty level or
distribution across countries.4
3. Data
We use data from two main sources. The World Bank’s online PovcalNet project5 provides
data on the levels and distributions of expenditures for selected countries and years, while
data on aggregate income from different countries’ national income and product accounts is
compiled in the World Development Indicator (WDI) database. Additional data on various
country characteristics that we use is also from the WDI unless indicated otherwise.6 We
discuss data on both expenditures and income below.
2This is because the distribution of income and expenditures across the population can be quite different
(Milanovic, 2006), and theory strongly suggests that the response of expenditures and income to changes in
sectoral productivity may be very different (Deaton, 1992).
3For example, Bravo-Ortega and Lederman (2005) take a country-focused approach, while Christiaensen
et al. (2011) use a global approach (though without weighting countries by population).
4This is because population-weighted analysis of the global distribution of welfare over the recent decades
would be dominated by the changes in distribution in just two large countries with rapid growth, India and
China, for which we already have analyses (Ravallion and Datt, 1996; Ravallion and Chen, 2007).
5http://iresearch.world.org/PovcalNet; downloaded 2014.
6http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators; downloaded 2014.
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3.1. Expenditure Data. Over the last several decades, the World Bank has accumulated
a large number of datasets from a large number of developing countries which are based on
household-level surveys, statistically representative of the populations of those countries, and
which include data on non-durable goods expenditures. Though the micro-data from these
surveys are not generally available, the World Bank provides data on aggregate expenditures
by decile for many of these countries. Our sample is restricted to the countries and years
for which we have information on expenditures data for at least three points in time (two
differences). The sample covers 62 countries, with variable numbers of observations over
1978 to 2011, totaling 310 surveys.
This sample of countries and years is not a random sample of the countries of the world.
Instead, it is a sample of countries where household expenditure surveys have been conducted
(perhaps under the auspices of the World Bank). It has however a large coverage, including
81% of the population in low and middle-income countries in 2000. In terms of continents, the
sample includes 97% of the population of South Asia, 70% of Sub-Saharan Africa, and 20% of
Latin America and Caribbean.7 There is no clear bias in this sampling of developing countries
except for the obvious and egregious absence of all but one Latin American countries. We
are thus reasonably confident that the analysis given here can be applied to all developing
countries save those in Latin America.
A third of the countries in our data have a first survey before 1990 while information starts
in the 1990s for the other countries. Some statistics are given in Table 1. The lowest three
expenditure deciles garner on average 12% of aggregate expenditures, while the highest three
deciles enjoy 57% (with more than 30% for the highest decile). The average expenditure ratio
of the highest to lowest group is thus 5.12. On average, the lowest income deciles have seen
their income grow at a faster rate (3.2% annually) than the upper three deciles (2.7%), and
the ratio of highest to lowest expenditures has fallen by .05 per year. This average however
hides heterogeneity, with an increase in inequality in 24 of the countries, notably China,
Rwanda, Macedonia and South Africa.
Table 2 documents in more details the expenditure growth rates of the different deciles
for several groups of countries that we will consider later in the analysis, i.e., by continent,
literacy level, poverty level, and inequality. The table exhibits two important facts about
expenditure growth in our sample of countries. The first is that nearly every group has
7The sample includes 57% of the population of the low-income countries (the large missing countries are
the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Korea, Afghanistan, and Madagascar), 87%
of the lower middle-income countries, 80% of the upper-middle income countries, 58% of the high-income
non-OECD countries and only 6% of the high-income OECD countries. The large missing countries of
Sub-Saharan Africa are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire, Madagascar, and Angola.
For most of Latin American countries, PovCalNet reports aggregate data by deciles of income rather than
expenditures.
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positive average real expenditure growth. The second is that poorer deciles’ expenditures
grow more quickly than wealthier deciles. The monotonicity of expenditure growth seems to
be a quite robust feature of these data.
3.2. Sectoral Income Data. Corresponding to this period of observation, we have annual
measures of agricultural, non-agricultural, and aggregate incomes. Table 1 shows an average
annual growth of real GDP per capita of 3.5%,8 varies across with a sharp contrast between
a dynamic non-agricultural sector (with average growth rate of 4.2%) and the agricultural
sector which on average was stagnant. Note however a large standard deviation that reveals
large heterogeneity across countries. Figure 1 plots average annual growth rates of agriculture
against growth rates outside of agriculture for the countries in our sample over the period
1980–2011. Overall, the growth in these two sectors of the economy are correlated, though
not surprisingly the agricultural sector grows at a slower rate almost everywhere. There is
however great heterogeneity in terms of both growth level and disparity between the sectors
across countries. In the upper right corner of the graph, China, Cambodia, Armenia and
Vietnam exhibit sustained high growth rates exceeding 6% annually in non-agriculture and
2–4% in agriculture over 30 years. Very low agricultural performance is seen in Russia and
Eastern-European countries during this period of transition. Several African countries are
below the fitted line (Central African Republic, Zambia, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Morocco) meaning that the performance of their agriculture sector relative to the
rest of the economy was better than average.
4. Methods
Index the set of countries in our dataset by ` = 1, 2, . . . , L, and index time by t ∈
{1, 2, . . . , T} = T. Let q index expenditure quantiles (deciles in this application). The
value of expenditures for quantile q in country ` at time t is denoted by c
(`,q)
t .
Suppose that total income y`t of country ` at time t is derived from two sectors, so that
y`t = y
1
`t + y
2
`t.
Then, since changes in logarithms approximate growth rates, we have
(1) ∆ log y`t ≈ θ1`t−1∆ log y1`t + θ2`t−1∆ log y2`t,
where θ1`t−1 and θ
2
`t−1 represent the shares of agricultural and non-agricultural sectors in GDP
in year t− 1 respectively.
8Data on GDP and sectoral value added are taken from the World Development Indicators database, as is
the GDP deflators we use to obtain ‘real’ measures of income and expenditures. Note that because we work
with growth rates the base year of the deflator (which varies across countries) is immaterial, and there’s no
need to use PPP or other conversions.
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This decomposition of aggregate income growth then motivates the estimating equation
(2) ∆ log c
(`,q)
t = α
q +
2∑
s=1
βsqθ
s
`t−1∆ log y
s
`t + ηt + 
(`,q)
t .
Here the terms {αq} are quantile ‘fixed effects’ which capture variation in differences in
the expected trend of log expenditures across quantiles, but not across time or countries.9
The terms β1qθ
1
`t−1∆ log y
1
`t and β
2
qθ
2
`t−1∆ log y
2
`t capture, respectively, the average effect of
growth in total income from the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors on the growth
of expenditures of quantile q. The time fixed effects ηt account for the variation across
time that is common to all countries and deciles, related, for example, to changes in the
international prices of agricultural commodities or interest rates, or to technological changes.
The disturbance term 
(`,q)
t captures the influence of unobservables on expenditure growth.
In (2) the parameters βsq represent the elasticity of expenditures of decile q with respect
to aggregate growth originating from sector s (analogous to what Christiaensen et al. (2011)
call the participation effect of income growth on poverty). These parameters indicate the
relative effects of the m sectors, controlling for their size.
4.1. Accounting for an Unbalanced Panel. The panel we are working with for this
problem is quite unbalanced. It is unbalanced not only because we have data on expenditures
in different country-quantiles over variable periods of time, but also because the intervals
between periods in which we have data are variable.
When one wishes to estimate an equation such as (2) using an unbalanced panel, the
first difficulty one encounters is simply dealing with the fact that one cannot always observe
the first differences ∆ log c
(`,q)
t , since any given country ` with data at t won’t necessarily
also have data in an adjacent period—we observe expenditures for a given country ` only in
periods T` = {t`1, t`2, . . . , t`T`} which is a subset of all the periods we could hope to have data
for, T.
An example may help. Suppose that we are interested in evaluating (2) for country ` at
t`2, and that the previous year of observation t
`
1 is three periods earlier, so that t
`
2 − t`1 = 3.
Let ∆d denote the d-difference operator: for any sequence {xt} we define the operator
by ∆dxt = xt − xt−d. In our example, we cannot calculate ∆ log c(`,q)t`2 , but we can calculate
∆t
`
2−t`1 log c(`,q)
t`2
.
9Making quantile effects invariant over time is justifiable if different quantiles within a country can be treated
as representative households. If many households move across deciles this could cause trouble, but this kind
of mobility is beyond our ability to deal with using these data.
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Now, how can we relate this third difference to the quantities we are actually interested
in measuring? It Is easy to see that we have
(3) ∆t
`
j−t`j−1 log c(`,q)
t`j
≡
t`j∑
r=t`j−1+1
∆ log c(`,q)r .
Using this identity along with (2) then allows us to construct an estimable expression in
which a variable difference appears on the left-hand side:
(4) ∆t
`
j−t`j−1 log c(`,q)
t`j
= (t`j − t`j−1)αq +
2∑
s=1
βsqθ
s
`t`j−1
∆t
`
j−t`j−1 log ys`t`j
+
t`j∑
r=t`j−1+1
ηr +
t`j∑
r=t`j−1+1
(`,q)r .
Each term directly corresponds to a similar term in (2). The left-hand term is a variable
difference, the variation depending on the years in which data is available for a particular
country. The “fixed effect” αq, which governs quantile specific growth trends must now be
scaled by the number of years in the difference t`j − t`j−1. The year-time effects will involve
a sum of several of these, since typically several years will pass between observations for a
given country `. The terms involving income growth (both agricultural and non-agricultural)
have also changed from first differences to variable differences. And finally, the disturbance
term will typically be a sequence of year-specific disturbance terms summed up to capture
all the effects of unobservables over the period between observations.
4.2. Measurement Error and Endogeneity. Agricultural income is notable for its volatil-
ity. This is particularly true for crop income that depends on erratic weather. Agricultural
income is also difficult to measure and to constrain to fit the concept of a calendar year.
Figure 2 illustrates the point using data from Morocco. A similar pattern is observed in
most of our sample countries: The average standard deviation of annual growth rates over
the period 1980–2011 is 7.2% for non-agricultural income and 11.1% for agricultural income.
Except for six countries, all have standard deviations of non-agricultural growth rates less
than 10%. In contrast, half the countries have standard deviations above 10% for agricul-
ture. This suggests that the value recorded as annual agricultural income is likely a poor
approximation of the permanent income from the agricultural sector, or its de facto contri-
bution to the welfare of the population in any given year. Taking growth rates over several
years between two surveys in our specification does not do much to attenuate this concern,
as these remain subject to the hazard of the specific values at the end points. This creates a
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phenomenon akin to measurement errors, with attenuation bias on the estimated coefficients
as a consequence.
A second concern relates to the possible endogeneity of sectoral growth. Unobserved
shocks which influence either the level or the distribution of expenditures within a country
may also influence aggregate sources of income. Examples (depending on the model) might
include movement of the real exchange rate or of the interest rate, price controls, or subsidy
schemes.
To deal with these two problems of measurement error and potential endogeneity, we
adopt a simple instrumental variables strategy. We use the mean of neighboring countries’
growth rates of sectoral income as an instrument for own sectoral income growth, a strategy
similar to one employed (in a household context) by Gertler and Molyneaux (2000). The
idea is that many of the unobserved shocks which might simultaneously influence income
and expenditures will be country-specific, while at least some of the shocks which influence
sectoral productivity (e.g., weather related shocks for agriculture) are likely to be correlated
across neighboring countries.10
These first stage regressions for the (weighted) sectoral growth rate of country ` between
years t`j−1 and t
`
j is:
(5) θs`t`j−1
∆ log ys`t`j
= γsθs−`t`j−1∆ log y
s
−`t`j +
t`j∑
r=t`j−1+1
ηr + v
s,`
t`j
s = 1, 2;
where θs−`t`j−1
∆ log ys−`t`j
represents the average sectoral growth in neighboring countries be-
tween years t`j−1 and t
`
j (weighted by those countries’ lagged shares). The sectoral value-
added data necessary for the construction of the instruments are available from the World
Development Indicator database for all relevant countries and all years. For example, the
instrument for Mexico sectoral growth between 1996 and 1998 is the weighted average of the
sectoral growth between 1996 and 1998 of its three neighboring countries, USA, Guatemala
and Belize, regardless of whether these countries and years are among the countries and
years for which we observe expenditures per deciles.11
10At the suggestion of our referees, we’ve also experimented with using a Hodrick-Prescott filter to extract
the ‘trend’ from our agriculture variable. This procedure does not result in significant differences in our
estimated coefficients.
11Consistency of our estimator requires that the error term (`,q)t be orthogonal to the instruments, conditional
on the time and quantile fixed effects. But if measurement errors in sectoral income growth are correlated
across neighboring countries, or if the process which determines growth in deciles’ expenditures also plays
a role in determining neighboring countries’ aggregate sectoral incomes then our estimator will not be
consistent. It Is not clear how to test for either of these possible problems; however, the assumptions required
for consistency of our estimator are weaker than what is typically assumed elsewhere in the cross-country
literature.
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Estimates of the γs parameters are reported in Table 3. The two columns are for the
agricultural income and non-agricultural income, respectively. The rows each employ a
different unobserved effects strategy, starting with just a constant (or, more precisely the
time elapsed between rounds, as in the first term of (4)); then substituting a set of continent
dummies; then a set of year effects (added up, also as in (4)); then finally combining both
year and continent effects.
Coefficients are fairly precisely estimated, and significant. The F -statistic associated with
a test of the null hypothesis that both coefficients are zero comfortably exceeds the Staiger
and Stock (1997) rule-of-thumb value of 10 in every case, indicating that weak instruments
are not a problem. However, the table also reveals something about our instruments.
For the agriculture regressions, coefficients and standard errors are fairly insensitive to
the unobserved effects strategy we employ, with coefficient estimates ranging from 0.360 to
0.295. R2 statistics for the agriculture regressions do change, but only importantly when we
add year effects—the addition of continent fixed effects has only a very modest impact on the
fit of the regressions. This is an indication that there is important time-series variation in
agricultural income growth common to all countries, rather than being peculiar to neighbors’
average growth rates.
For the non-agricultural regressions we see a different pattern. Coefficients respond
strongly to the addition of continent dummies, and modestly to the addition of year ef-
fects. With the full set of continent and year dummies the t-statistic on neighbors’ average
growth of non-agriculture income falls to a value less than three—large enough to reject
zero, but if we were only instrumenting for non-agricultural income implying an F -statistic
below the Staiger-Stock rule of thumb. This is not what we do, of course, but this first stage
regression hints that our instrumental variables estimator may be relatively imprecise.12
5. Results
The central finding of this paper is that across countries, growth in GDP from agriculture
has a larger effect on the expenditures of the poor than does growth in GDP from other
sectors. In this section we make this point using a series of different tools. We first present
a simple graphical analysis, then proceed with OLS and IV estimations.
Having established that on average growth in GDP originating in agriculture is more
beneficial for poorer deciles, we finally explore whether this is a pattern which holds across
different groupings of countries.
12In our search for good instruments, we have also considered rainfall, smoothed series, and various lags.
In some cases we cannot reject the null hypothesis that coefficients are unchanged (rainfall, lagged neigh-
bors’ averages). In other cases the addition of the alternative instrument to our basic set allows a test of
overidentifying restrictions, which we reject (lagged own growth).
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5.1. Graphical Results. To illustrate the point that we will make more rigorously in what
follows, in Figure 3 we plot the difference in expenditure growth between the three lowest
and three highest deciles against the difference in sectoral growth. The sectoral growth rates
are each estimated over the period of observation for the expenditures.
We observe a positive correlation between a relatively higher growth in agriculture and
higher growth in expenditures for the poorest deciles. However, there is also considerable
heterogeneity in the distribution of expenditures even for a given difference in sectoral growth.
The different points on the scatterplot of Figure 3 have different markers depending on
whether the country is in Africa, Asia, or some “Other” continent. Very informally one
can see that these three continental groupings seem to have different behavior. Most of the
countries of Asia are clustered near the center of the figure, showing a relatively ‘balanced’
growth process, with small differences between both agricultural and non-agricultural sources
of growth and also small differences in expenditure growth rates across deciles. In contrast,
a group of mostly Eastern European countries have much larger growth rates in income
outside of agriculture but relatively equal rates of expenditure growth, creating a cluster in
the left-hand side of the figure. All African countries, but Nigeria, are found much farther
to the right, where the relative rate of agricultural income growth is higher. An ‘eye-ball’
regression just using the African countries suggests a much higher correlation; this is an issue
we return to below.
5.2. Ordinary Least Squares with Unobserved Effects. As a first attempt at esti-
mating (4), we follow the lead given by the empirical studies mentioned in Section 2 and
simply use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to compute point estimates of the elasticities
βsq , controlling for time and continent effects. Time fixed effects accommodate aggregate
shocks to expenditures or sectoral sources of income; Continent fixed effects help account
for the clustering by continents observed in Figure 3 that might otherwise lead to biased
estimates.To compute the standard errors of these point estimates we adapt a procedure
described by Stock and Watson (2008), which permits arbitrary forms of heteroskedastic-
ity and correlation across quantiles (Stock and Watson’s method is designed for balanced
panels).
OLS results are reported in Table 4. None of the coefficients associated with growth in
agricultural income is significant; and neither for agriculture do we observe a strict pattern
of monotonically declining coefficients across deciles that we observed in our discussion of
expenditure growth. Further, in no case are estimated agricultural coefficients significantly
different from the non-agricultural coefficients within a decile, owing perhaps to our rel-
atively imprecise estimates of the agriculture coefficients. However, income derived from
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non-agricultural sources is statistically significant for every decile above the first, and does
increase monotonically across deciles.
The coefficients have an interpretation as share-weighted elasticities. For example, Table
4 suggests that on average a one percentage point increase in GDP due to non-agricultural
income growth is associated with approximately a half percentage point increase in the
growth rate of expenditures, with higher values for higher deciles and lower values for lower
deciles. This would indicate a regressive effect on the distribution of expenditures.
The results in Table 4 are estimated using a set of decile, year, and continent effects, but
with this estimator and specification these are not of great importance. Estimating the same
equation but with only a constant or only continent dummies results in coefficient estimates
which are somewhat larger in magnitude, but with no appreciable difference in precision and
only a modest improvement in fit.
5.3. Instrumental Variables with Unobserved Effects. We next turn to the instrumen-
tal variable estimator described above to deal with measurement errors in agricultural growth
and to address some possible forms of endogeneity in both agricultural and non-agricultural
income growth.
Results using this instrumental variables estimator appear in Table 5. The first thing to
notice is that for agriculture the pattern of monotonicity described earlier survives in this
specification, with coefficients for agricultural growth decreasing across deciles; however, here
the non-agricultural coefficients are not strictly monotonic.
The second thing to notice is that coefficients for agriculture and non-agriculture are sig-
nificantly different at conventional levels (see the rows of Table 5 with the χ2 statistics),
with p-values less than 0.05 for the bottom six deciles. This is the chief evidence support-
ing our general finding that growth originating in different sectors has different effects on
households in different parts of the expenditure distribution. Re-estimating this relationship
with different unobserved effects strategies yields results that are slightly weaker but broadly
consistent—in any event a joint test of the equality of coefficients across sectors for all deciles
leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis of equality.
The third thing to notice is that while growth from agriculture has a positive and significant
(at the 10% level of confidence) effect on expenditure growth for the bottom five deciles,
growth from other sectors is never significant. One cannot reject the null hypothesis that no
decile benefits from non-agricultural sources of GDP growth.13 Point estimates associated
13Loayza and Raddatz (2010) argue that sectors which are intensive in unskilled labor (agriculture, man-
ufacturing, and construction) reduce poverty more than other sectors (services, mining, utilities). We’ve
experimented with a three-sector specification (agriculture, industry, and services; the best our data allows),
and found (i) that this has no significant effect on our estimates of the coefficients associated with growth
from agriculture; and (ii) that we are generally unable to reject the null hypothesis that coefficients on
industry and services are equal to each other.
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with growth from non-agricultural sectors are in fact negative for the bottom eight deciles,
but little should be made of this fact, both because none of these coefficients are significant
and because even if significant these negative coefficients would only be an indication that
non-agricultural income growth reduced expenditure growth relative to the positive mean
levels reported in Table 2, not that it actually makes it negative.
Taken together these results suggest a progressive effect of income growth originating in
agriculture: a one percentage point increase in GDP due to agricultural income growth is
associated with a 6.8 percentage point increase in the growth rate of expenditures of the
bottom decile, declining to 4.4 percentage points for the fifth decile, and with no effect at
all on the highest decile.
Note the differences between our instrumental variables and OLS results. Estimated co-
efficients associated with agriculture are much higher in Table 5, suggesting that the OLS
coefficients were attenuated by measurement error, in line with our discussion above in Sec-
tion 4.2. At the same time coefficients associated with non-agricultural income growth are
lower (though not significantly so) and have considerably higher standard errors than in the
OLS case.
The results we have which seem quite robust are (i) monotonicity of the effects of agri-
cultural income growth across deciles, indicating a certain progressivity in the effects of
agricultural income on the distribution of expenditures; and (ii) significantly different effects
from income originating in different sectors.
5.4. Heterogeneity. We next turn our attention to the question of whether the effects
of income growth from different sectors on expenditures differ across countries. We are
interested in particular in whether there is heterogeneity across different particular observable
groups. We might expect such heterogeneity to stem from differences in endowments or social
conditions across countries. We consider four ways of dividing countries: the initial level of
poverty; the initial level of inequality; the initial level of adult literacy;14 and conclude with
the contrast across continents, which of course may capture many differences in endowments
and social structures.15,16
14All these are “initial” values because we want to only introduce interaction variables that are pre-
determined. What we actually use, of course, is the initial year a country appears in our dataset.
15Datt and Ravallion (1998b), Ravallion and Datt (2002), and Byerlee et al. (2005) all suggest that inequality
in land endowments may be another important determinant of the effects of aggregate agricultural growth
on the poor. However, unfortunately we do not have cross-country data which would allow us to measure
landlessness or inequality in land-holdings. Experiments with different measures of arable land did not reveal
interesting differences, but none of these measures captured inequality or landlessness.
16In principle, one could extend this exploration of heterogeneity by allowing for higher orders of interaction—
perhaps the effects of agricultural income growth on expenditure growth are different across poor countries
which have high and low levels of literacy, for example. But in practice the limitations of our dataset don’t
allow us to draw such fine distinctions.
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5.4.1. Initial Poverty. Our work so far addresses the question of how income growth from
agriculture affects the distribution of expenditures within countries, rather than across them.
We are now able to say something about the effects of such growth on the global distribution
of welfare by asking whether the effects of income growth from agriculture on distribution
are different for poorer and wealthier countries within our sample.
We group countries by initial level of (headcount) poverty rates and report results in
Table 6. In our sample, the median poverty rate across countries is 15.27%, ranging from
a minimum of 0.04% in Bosnia and Herzogovina to 81.32% in Burundi.17 Because we are
interested in whether there is heterogeneity in elasticities across the global ranking of poverty
rates, not the ranking within continents, we produce these results without the extra continent
dummies that we have used in most of the analysis above.
There are several things worthy of note in Table 6. First, one can reject the null hypothesis
that there is no heterogeneity by country poverty level. Specifically, one can reject the
hypotheses that coefficients are equal across poorer and wealthier countries in the bottom
three deciles (the first row of χ2 statistics).
Second, the robust pattern of monotonicity observed elsewhere for the coefficients associ-
ated with agriculture is preserved for poor countries, but the direction is nearly reversed for
wealthy countries. Thus, the progressive effect of agricultural income growth on distribution
seems to be confined to the poorer half of the countries in our sample.
Third, we can reject the hypothesis that agricultural and non-agricultural coefficients are
equal within the poorer half of countries (the second row of χ2 statistics) for the bottom
six deciles, in line with the baseline results of Table 5. However, we cannot reject equality
among the richer half of countries. This is additional evidence that the progressive effect of
agricultural income growth on the welfare of the poor may be confined to the poor in the
poorest countries.
Our findings here are related to results found by other authors. For example, Christiaensen
et al. (2011) finds that agriculture growth matters most for poverty reduction when using
the poverty line of $1 per capita rather that $2 per capita. Though our results are not di-
rectly comparable (because we use expenditures rather than poverty status as our dependent
variable), in our analysis the income level of the deciles nevertheless directly measures the
intensity of poverty, since lower deciles in poorer countries are typically poorer than lower
deciles in richer countries.
All of the three notable findings discussed above turn out to also be true when we look
at poverty across countries within a continent, by estimating (4) while including continent
dummies. However, in this specification the addition of extra controls causes the significance
17Poverty rate is here defined by the share of the population with a consumption per capita of less that $1.25
per day in 2000 Purchasing Power Parity US dollars.
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of the individual coefficients seen in Table 6 to disappear. Thus, though income growth from
agriculture affects the expenditure distribution differently in poor and wealthy countries, the
fact that with the addition of continent effects the individual significance vanishes suggests
that the continent (beyond the proportion of poor countries in the continent) may matter
in understanding these patterns, a question we return to below.
5.4.2. Initial Inequality. One interpretation of the results of last section is that it is not really
poorer countries, but less equal countries to which this applies, and we only find our earlier
results because less equal countries also tend to be countries with more poor. This certainly
isn’t a new idea: Datt and Ravallion (1998b), Ravallion (2007), Suryahadi et al. (2009),
and Christiaensen et al. (2011) all argue for the possible importance of initial inequality in
understanding the effects of aggregate sectoral income growth on poverty.
We do not really have the data to distinguish between these two hypotheses adequately,
but we can at least divide countries according to initial inequality and see what happens.
We divide countries into groups depending on whether their initial Gini coefficient is above
or below the median. Results from this exercise are reported in Table 7.
In contrast with our poverty results, dividing countries by initial inequality preserves
our earlier monotonicity results for both more and less unequal countries, with agriculture
tending to differentially benefit poorer households in both groups. However, we can no
longer reject the hypothesis that coefficients are the same across groups, whether we include
continent fixed effects or not, leading us to conclude that initial inequality may be a less
salient dimension of heterogeneity across countries than is initial poverty.
5.4.3. Literacy. Datt and Ravallion (1998b), Ravallion and Datt (2002), and Suryahadi et al.
(2009) all pay attention to the possible role of literacy in explaining the effects of sectoral
income growth on household welfare; the idea is that it may not be poverty per se that
affects households’ responses to sectoral productivity shocks, but the effects of these shocks
on the marginal product of human capital. Accordingly, in Table 8 countries are grouped
by whether the rate of adult literacy is above or below the median. Results are consistent
with the view that literacy matters: In countries with low literacy rates, agricultural growth
plays a very progressive role in fostering expenditures of lower deciles, with sharply declining
elasticities from 6.75 to −3.2. In contrast, in high literacy countries, elasticities are increasing
from 4.1 to 6.7 (though these are not significant).
Because the results are perhaps slightly stronger in Table 6 we have a slight preference
for the hypothesis that poverty plays a key role rather than literacy, but this contrast of
course should not be interpreted as causal. Adult literacy rates and the poverty level are
fairly highly (negatively) correlated, with a Spearman correlation coefficient of -0.71; we
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really have no good way to distinguish between the importance of a country being poor or
a country having a high rate of adult literacy using these data.
5.4.4. Continents. We finally turn to a broader classification, dividing countries by conti-
nents (Africa, Asia, and “Other”). We are interested in exploring whether these different
geographical groupings have different responses to growth from different sectors, as Figure
3 seemed to hint.
We reject the hypothesis that coefficients are the same across continental groupings (the
first row of χ2 statistics in Table 9) for the first three deciles, confirming the hypothesis
generated by Figure 3. Recalling that much of the variation in that figure seemed to be due
to African countries, we confirm in Table 9 that only African countries have significantly
different coefficients across sectors, just as only poorer countries exhibit significant differences
in Table 6; the Spearman correlation coefficient between initial country poverty and “Africa”
is 0.59. Monotonicity is preserved in Africa and Asia, but fails in the “Other” continent.
6. Conclusion
We have explored some different approaches toward estimating the effects of agricultural
growth on expenditure growth and distribution. Our basic approach takes advantage of the
fact that we have data on both aggregate rates of expenditure growth across countries, and
on changes in the distribution of these expenditures across households.
We improve on much of the existing literature by exploiting the additional information
available in the distribution of expenditures beyond poverty status, but also in using instru-
mental variables techniques to deal with problems of measurement error and endogeneity.
Our instruments are constructed by averaging over sectoral income growth rates for neigh-
boring countries. We also take advantage of the panel aspect of these data, a task which is
complicated by the extremely unbalanced nature of the panel.
We find first that income growth from agriculture has a progressive effect on the distribu-
tion of expenditures; this seems a very robust feature of the data, that survives nearly all
our experiments. We also find that the sectoral composition of income matters—coefficients
on income from agriculture and income from other sectors are significantly different for the
lower deciles.
Finally, we explore the possibility of heterogeneity across countries, experimenting with
dividing countries according to their initial poverty rates, their initial (Gini) inequality,
their initial rates of adult literacy, and simply dividing them by continents. Several of these
groupings are fairly highly correlated, making it impossible (with these data) to say that
one grouping is ‘right’ while the others are wrong. But dividing the data by initial poverty,
initial literacy, and continent all lead to a rejection of the hypothesis of groups having the
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same response, so that there does indeed seem to be important heterogeneity. Our preferred
division and strongest results involve initial poverty—we draw the conclusion that income
growth from agriculture is disproportionately beneficial for the poorest households in the
poorer countries.
This last result suggests that the strong poverty reduction impact of agricultural growth
is likely to weaken as development progresses. This is plausibly because the poor population
will be less located in rural areas and working in agriculture and will instead reside in
urban areas (reducing the direct effects of agriculture) and that food markets will be more
integrated in the world economy (reducing the food price channel). The drivers of poverty
reduction will then have to be found in the labor intensive sectors and in the cities. Our
study however suggests that this is not yet the case for the poorer countries of the world.
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Figures
Figure 1. Average annual growth in real income from non-agricultural
sources versus agricultural sources over the period 1980–2011.
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Figure 2. Illustration using Morocco.
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Figure 3. Differences in growth rates in expenditures versus differences in
growth rates for agricultural and non-agricultural income.
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Tables
Mean Std. Dev.
Panel A — Expenditures
Share of total expenditures (%)
Lowest decile 2.9 0.7
Highest decile 30.3 5.4
Deciles 1–3 11.9 2.4
Deciles 8–10 57.1 5.3
Ratio deciles 8–10/1–3 5.12 1.86
Average annual growth rate in expenditures/capita
Deciles 1–3 0.032 0.030
Deciles 8–10 0.027 0.030
Annual change in ratio 8–10/1–3 −0.047 0.178
Panel B — Income
GDP/capita in (2000) USD 5301 4379
Average share of Agriculture 0.24 0.14
In Africa 0.31 0.16
In Asia 0.30 0.12
In other Continents 0.18 0.11
Average annual growth rates in value-added
Aggregate GDP/capita 0.035 0.029
Agriculture 0.004 0.025
Non-agriculture 0.042 0.032
Table 1. Expenditures in the year closest to 2000 for each country; annual
growth over the years of observation for each country, from survey data for
expenditures and from annual data for sectoral growth.
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Agriculture Non-Agriculture
Coeff. Std. Err R2 Coeff. Std. Err R2
Constant 0.360 0.061 0.101 0.608 0.050 0.321
Continent FE 0.351 0.066 0.108 0.341 0.064 0.403
Year Effects 0.333 0.064 0.180 0.393 0.066 0.434
Continent & Year 0.295 0.069 0.192 0.188 0.072 0.505
Table 3. ‘First stage’ regressions of the growth rate of sectoral income on
the average of neighboring countries’ growth rates of sectoral income. Labels
in first column indicate the unobserved effects strategy for the regression.
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Obs. 310 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
θ∆ log Agriculture 1.11 0.69 0.52 0.43 0.38 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.54
(0.97) (0.76) (0.69) (0.66) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.66) (0.68) (0.81)
θ∆ log NonAgriculture 0.23 0.38∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21)
Decile -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
χ2 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1
p-value (0.378) (0.691) (0.946) (0.893) (0.801) (0.748) (0.708) (0.691) (0.667) (0.794)
Table 4. Expenditure growth by decile and sectoral income regressed on share-weighted sectoral incomes.
The χ2 statistics test the hypothesis that coefficients are equal across sectors. Point estimates from OLS. Using
Year effects. Using Continent Fixed Effects.
2
9
Obs. 310 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
θ∆ log Agriculture 5.65∗ 4.68∗ 4.45∗ 4.19∗ 3.93∗ 3.65∗ 3.35∗ 3.00 2.54 0.12
(3.13) (2.53) (2.32) (2.19) (2.09) (2.00) (1.93) (1.88) (1.86) (2.25)
θ∆ log NonAgriculture −0.12 −0.06 0.03 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.26 0.32 0.42
(0.54) (0.43) (0.40) (0.38) (0.36) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.47)
Decile -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
χ2 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.4 3.1 2.7 2.2 1.5 0.0
p-value (0.066) (0.059) (0.055) (0.058) (0.065) (0.078) (0.100) (0.141) (0.228) (0.895)
Table 5. Instrumental Variables Results. Expenditure growth by decile and sectoral income regressed on
share-weighted sectoral incomes. The χ2 statistics test the hypothesis that coefficients are equal across sectors.
Using Year effects.
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Obs. 310 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Poorer x θ∆ log Agricul-
ture
7.98∗∗∗ 5.95∗∗ 5.31∗∗ 4.77∗∗ 4.28∗∗ 3.80∗∗ 3.30∗∗ 2.76∗ 2.05 −2.01
(3.04) (2.47) (2.22) (2.04) (1.87) (1.71) (1.57) (1.43) (1.32) (1.67)
Poorer x θ∆ log NonAgri-
culture
−1.80 −1.43 −1.15 −0.97 −0.81 −0.67 −0.53 −0.39 −0.22 0.33
(1.31) (1.08) (1.01) (0.97) (0.93) (0.91) (0.89) (0.88) (0.89) (1.09)
Wealthier x θ∆ log Agri-
culture
5.63 7.39 7.91 8.12 8.16 8.15 8.11 8.02 7.88 9.87
(16.12) (14.92) (15.20) (15.53) (15.77) (15.98) (16.17) (16.37) (16.63) (19.41)
Wealthier x θ∆ log
NonAgriculture
−0.37 −0.27 −0.14 −0.07 −0.01 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.24 0.40
(0.69) (0.57) (0.53) (0.50) (0.48) (0.46) (0.45) (0.44) (0.44) (0.54)
Decile -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
χ2 8.0 6.7 6.2 5.8 5.3 4.7 4.0 3.1 1.7 2.8
p-value (0.018) (0.035) (0.044) (0.055) (0.071) (0.094) (0.136) (0.217) (0.431) (0.247)
χ2 (Equal among
“Poorer”)
7.6 6.5 6.1 5.6 5.1 4.4 3.7 2.8 1.6 1.1
p-value (0.006) (0.010) (0.014) (0.018) (0.024) (0.035) (0.055) (0.095) (0.211) (0.300)
χ2 (Equal among
“Wealthier”)
0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
p-value (0.715) (0.613) (0.601) (0.602) (0.609) (0.616) (0.624) (0.635) (0.649) (0.629)
Table 6. Interactions between sectoral income variables and whether (initial) poverty rate is above or below
the median. Using Year effects.
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Obs. 310 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Less equal x θ∆ log Agri-
culture
6.02∗ 5.08∗ 4.78∗∗ 4.43∗∗ 4.08∗∗ 3.73∗∗ 3.33∗∗ 2.87∗ 2.22 −0.61
(3.29) (2.71) (2.42) (2.19) (1.99) (1.81) (1.64) (1.48) (1.36) (1.59)
Less equal x θ∆ log
NonAgriculture
−0.47 −0.40 −0.26 −0.18 −0.11 −0.05 0.01 0.08 0.15 0.33
(0.99) (0.77) (0.72) (0.68) (0.66) (0.65) (0.65) (0.66) (0.70) (0.98)
More equal x θ∆ log Agri-
culture
3.61 2.65 2.74 2.73 2.69 2.61 2.55 2.47 2.39 0.99
(5.01) (4.04) (3.93) (3.91) (3.93) (3.96) (4.01) (4.10) (4.26) (5.18)
More equal x θ∆ log
NonAgriculture
0.05 0.11 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.31
(0.51) (0.40) (0.38) (0.36) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.43)
Decile -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
χ2 4.0 4.3 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.3 3.8 3.1 1.9 0.3
p-value (0.133) (0.115) (0.102) (0.101) (0.106) (0.118) (0.149) (0.215) (0.395) (0.859)
χ2 (Equal among “Less
equal”)
4.0 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.3 3.8 3.1 1.8 0.2
p-value (0.047) (0.039) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.039) (0.051) (0.080) (0.175) (0.617)
χ2 (Equal among “More
equal”)
0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.0
p-value (0.483) (0.533) (0.520) (0.529) (0.542) (0.564) (0.583) (0.607) (0.636) (0.899)
Table 7. Interactions between sectoral income variables and whether (initial) Gini coefficient is above or below
the median. Using Year effects.
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Obs. 310 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
High Literacy x θ∆ log
Agriculture
4.10 4.85 5.29 5.54 5.65 5.73 5.80 5.85 5.94 6.68
(6.08) (5.24) (5.29) (5.43) (5.57) (5.70) (5.84) (5.98) (6.19) (7.19)
High Literacy x θ∆ log
NonAgriculture
−0.23 −0.14 −0.03 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.18 0.22 0.28 0.41
(0.58) (0.45) (0.41) (0.39) (0.38) (0.37) (0.36) (0.37) (0.38) (0.55)
Low Literacy x θ∆ log
Agriculture
6.74∗∗ 4.83∗ 4.21∗ 3.68∗ 3.21∗ 2.74∗ 2.24 1.68 0.93 −3.17∗
(3.11) (2.48) (2.22) (2.00) (1.82) (1.64) (1.49) (1.34) (1.24) (1.75)
Low Literacy x θ∆ log
NonAgriculture
−0.86 −0.66 −0.45 −0.35 −0.28 −0.22 −0.17 −0.12 −0.04 0.18
(1.16) (0.92) (0.85) (0.81) (0.79) (0.78) (0.78) (0.80) (0.85) (1.27)
Decile -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
χ2 5.3 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.0 2.2 1.2 3.6
p-value (0.069) (0.089) (0.098) (0.113) (0.132) (0.165) (0.222) (0.328) (0.536) (0.164)
χ2 (Equal among “High
Literacy”)
0.5 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8
p-value (0.474) (0.336) (0.310) (0.307) (0.313) (0.321) (0.330) (0.342) (0.355) (0.378)
χ2 (Equal among “Low
Literacy”)
5.2 4.3 3.9 3.5 3.2 2.8 2.2 1.4 0.5 2.6
p-value (0.023) (0.039) (0.049) (0.060) (0.073) (0.095) (0.138) (0.230) (0.497) (0.105)
Table 8. Interactions between sectoral income variables and whether (initial) adult literacy rate is above or
below the median. Using Year effects.
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Obs. 310 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
AF x θ∆ log Agriculture 7.31 4.07 3.29 2.71 2.28 1.88 1.53 1.20 0.76 −2.71
(5.53) (4.98) (4.47) (4.13) (3.79) (3.49) (3.16) (2.83) (2.49) (2.55)
AF x θ∆ log NonAgricul-
ture
−7.93 −7.93 −7.17 −6.63 −6.04 −5.49 −4.82 −4.07 −3.15 −1.06
(8.27) (7.49) (6.68) (6.17) (5.67) (5.25) (4.79) (4.34) (3.90) (4.18)
AS x θ∆ log Agriculture −13.86 −11.55 −8.96 −7.37 −5.89 −4.67 −3.31 −1.91 −0.28 2.34
(18.29) (16.57) (14.82) (13.76) (12.75) (11.93) (11.05) (10.24) (9.54) (10.88)
AS x θ∆ log NonAgricul-
ture
−2.29 −2.39 −2.22 −2.10 −1.96 −1.82 −1.65 −1.44 −1.19 −0.58
(3.40) (3.06) (2.72) (2.52) (2.32) (2.16) (1.98) (1.81) (1.64) (1.66)
Other x θ∆ log Agricul-
ture
9.05 5.78 4.65 3.97 3.37 2.88 2.47 2.06 1.64 1.15
(17.48) (15.55) (14.36) (13.60) (12.82) (12.13) (11.44) (10.72) (9.96) (8.63)
Other x θ∆ log NonAgri-
culture
−2.08 −2.14 −1.88 −1.70 −1.51 −1.33 −1.11 −0.87 −0.58 0.08
(2.42) (2.19) (1.95) (1.81) (1.66) (1.54) (1.40) (1.27) (1.14) (1.21)
Decile -0.17 -0.18 -0.17 -0.16 -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 -0.10 -0.06
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
χ2 9.1 6.6 6.2 5.8 5.4 4.9 4.4 3.8 2.7 0.3
p-value (0.028) (0.085) (0.101) (0.124) (0.146) (0.178) (0.219) (0.284) (0.435) (0.950)
χ2 (Equal among “AF”) 8.2 6.0 5.6 5.1 4.7 4.3 3.8 3.2 2.1 0.3
p-value (0.004) (0.014) (0.018) (0.024) (0.030) (0.039) (0.052) (0.075) (0.144) (0.567)
χ2 (Equal among “AS”) 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
p-value (0.492) (0.548) (0.621) (0.678) (0.739) (0.798) (0.872) (0.961) (0.920) (0.781)
χ2 (Equal among
“Other”)
0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
p-value (0.515) (0.602) (0.642) (0.670) (0.698) (0.724) (0.750) (0.781) (0.820) (0.898)
Table 9. Interactions between sectoral income variables and continents. Using Year effects. Average Spearman
correlation coefficient of error correction terms across deciles (Kendall’s W) is 0.660.
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